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The late 1990s was a period of Panglossian optimism. The world, we were told,
was getting smaller, increasingly seamless and it all had to do with ‘globalization’
(Ohmae 1994, Held et al. 1999, Giddens 1999, Friedman1999). From this perspective, the
movement seemed to lead inexorably to the worldwide convergence of economic,
technological and institutional conditions, fostering in the process a homogenization of
organizational recipes and national systems of economic organization. This process was
seen to be significantly accelerated, if not driven, by the internet revolution.
There was evidence, however, already during those years of high growth, that this
was an overly optimistic vision rather than a reality in march. Whole regions or
continents were entirely excluded from the global world economy (Sachs 2000). In those
countries that were part of it, the divide was increasing between institutions,
organizations and social groups that welcomed and benefited from a global economy and
those that dreaded, resented and resisted it. Furthermore, there were clear signs that
important differences persisted between national systems of economic organization,
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including within the small circle of countries that were at the core of the global economic
game. In spite of global pressures, national recipes for organizing the economy were
apparently quite resilient (Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997, Whitley 1999, European
Business Forum 2000a, European Business Forum 2000b).
There has been little overlap between the prophets of a global world economy and
those who point to the long-term persistence of ‘national variants’ of capitalism (Albert
1993). The tendency has been to either account for convergence beyond national
boundaries or document significant and resilient differences across countries. While those
two approaches differ on many grounds, their common weakness is that each provides
only a partial picture of our economic world and its evolution after 1945. In contrast, this
paper starts from the observation that both trends characterize at the very same time the
post Second World War period. A key puzzle is the fact that differences between national
systems of economic organization have persisted while similarities were undeniably
increasing. The challenge is to propose an account that can make sense of the coexistence
of these two apparently contradictory trends and of their lasting interplay throughout the
second part of the twentieth century. This requires, on the one hand, a deconstruction of
globalization – both in terms of historical origins and mechanisms. It also calls for a
systematic focus at the point of articulation between ‘global pressures’ and national
legacies.
After briefly reviewing the existing literature and its shortcomings, we define
‘national systems of economic organization’ and operationalize our dependent variable,
documenting the coexistence, after 1945, of the double trend identified above. Building
on detailed historical studies of three countries – France, Germany and Italy – and on
their systematic comparison (Djelic 1998), we then put forward the following story. The
current episode of globalization finds its historical roots in the attempted process of
Americanization that marked the years following the end of the Second World War.
Starting in those years, the American system of economic organization – which had itself
emerged earlier in peculiar and unique conditions – was constructed as a universal model
for the Western world. The large-scale and systematic attempt to transfer this one and
single model accounts in the end for the increasing similarities that can be documented
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across national systems of economic organization in the second half of the twentieth
century. A key driving force behind the attempt at cross-national transfer was, at least
throughout the early period, a multinational network of ‘modernizers’ working with or
around the Marshall Plan administration. The attempted transfer did not take place in a
vacuum, though, and it turned out as a consequence to be more or less successful in each
country. To a significant extent, differences in the degree to which national peculiarities
have persisted reflect the strength of incumbent rules and institutional legacies in a
particular country, the effectiveness of channels of transfer and the level of resistance
nationally.
Beyond global convergence and national paths – theorizing the interplay
The literature on national systems of economic organization is by now rich and
varied. There have been two major preoccupations, each in practice often exclusive of the
other. The first has been with convergence and increasing similarities across national
borders, particularly throughout the twentieth century. The other has been with the unique
character and long-term resilience of national models.
Pointing to economic and technological drivers, evolutionary arguments
emphasize convergence (Chandler 1962, 1977, 1990, Williamson 1975, 1985). The logic
of change, in those arguments, is neutral and universal. It has to do with the ‘laws of the
market’, with ‘technological progress’ or with ‘transaction costs’. The defining claim of
evolutionary arguments is that under those unavoidable pressures, national systems of
economic organization are bound to evolve quite significantly. They move ultimately
towards a common – most efficient – set of institutional and organizational arrangements.
Another research tradition also focuses on convergence, explaining it, though,
from quite a different perspective. For neo-institutionalists in the ‘phenomenological
tradition’ (Djelic 1999) structural convergence is driven by increasingly homogeneous
institutional environments the world over (Scott, Meyer et al. 1994). Human life is
structured by sets of cultural rules and norms. The latter have had a tendency, particularly
throughout the second part of the twentieth century, to become more and more similar
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across national boundaries – rationalization describing the overall evolution. In this
research tradition, national economies and their constituent parts are defined as emergent
social constructions embedded in larger institutional environments understood as sets of
cultural rules and norms. Homogenization of institutional environments across national
boundaries logically drives worldwide isomorphism in structural arrangements and
behavioral scripts, including – but not only – in the economic and business realm.
While there are important differences between evolutionary arguments and
‘phenomenological’ neo-institutionalism, some of the conclusions are shared. In both
cases, systems of economic organization evolve in response to inescapable demands
stemming from the environment – whether understood in its economic and technological
dimension or as a set of cultural rules. Transformations at the national level are
understood to take place along a predetermined trend or continuum, implying parallel
convergence towards a unique – and in the case of evolutionary arguments, superior – set
of structural arrangements. Both evolutionary arguments and ‘phenomenological’ neo-
institutionalism tend to see differences across countries as temporary. They tend to
explain away remaining national specificities by the particular stage of evolution of a
given country or by unduly strong obstacles on the evolutionary path. Ultimately, those
are likely to fade. Altogether, evolutionary arguments and ‘phenomenological’ neo-
institutionalism can help us account for increasing similarities between national systems
of economic organization. However, their common determinist and quasi-functionalist
nature means that they have a tendency to remain blind to timing, historical
embeddedness, actors and resistance. They do not allow us to understand the long-term
resilience of differences and the stubborn multiplicity of national systems of economic
organization.
In striking contrast to the preoccupation with convergence and isomorphism,
research on national variants of capitalism highlights resilient differences. The double
objective in that research tradition has been to account for the peculiarities of any given
national system of economic organization and to explain the long-term persistence of
structural differences across national boundaries. A common argument emerges where
systems of economic organization are described as embedded in unique institutional
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environments, historically structured, at least in their modern form, at the national level.
Overall, and as a consequence, we propose to label that tradition ‘historical neo-
institutionalism’ (Djelic 1999). There are two slightly different understandings, though,
of the nature of institutional environments that coexist under this broad label. One is
cultural (Dobbin 1994, D’Iribarne 1989). The other is more structural (Fligstein 1990,
Campbell, Hollingsworth and Lindberg eds. 1991, Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997,
Whitley 1999).
The proponents of a cultural understanding point to national cultures as socially
constructed belief and rule systems embodied in a set of basic practices. Historically, the
argument goes, different sets of beliefs have been stabilized and institutionalized at the
level of each nation, creating the context for different logics of action and multiple
‘rationalities’. Ultimately, national systems of economic organization are shaped by those
stable and long-standing rules (Dobbin 1994, D’Iribarne 1989). The structural perspective
underscores on the other hand the importance of states and political institutions as key
elements of the constraining institutional framework (Evans, Rueschmeyer and Skocpol
1985, Fligstein 1990, Campbell et al. 1991, Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997, Whitley
1999). Early patterns of state building and political choices at key turning points become
structural constraints that channel individual action and significantly limit the possibility
for change. Those structural institutional legacies create path dependencies at the national
level, which national systems of economic organization tend to reflect.
Beyond differences between the cultural and structural perspectives, all arguments
in the ‘historical neo- institutionalist’ tradition tend to share a common weakness. By
restricting the embedding environment to its national dimension, they forget or disregard
cross-national isomorphic pressures, which as a matter of fact are working their way in
the real world despite or around local peculiarities. Tracing differences across national
borders to country specific constraints, those accounts fail to consider the geopolitical
environment as a potential source and engine of change and transformation.
In the end it seems that there is room for theoretical cross-breeding. If we are
going to account for the paradoxical interplay between increasing worldwide
isomorphism and national path dependencies – and not merely for one trend or the other
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– then we need a framework that allows us to focus on both trends at the same time. We
will show below how a combination of phenomenological neo-institutionalism with
historical neo-institutionalism of the structural kind make it possible to go quite a way in
that direction.
National systems of economic organization – definitions and methods
A system of economic organization is defined here as a particular constellation of
rules and structures that shapes economic activity. Historically, and in the age of the
nation-state, these constellations have tended to be defined by national states (Weiss
1988, Dobbin 1994, Whitley 1999). Since those national states have been characterized
by varying levels of autonomy and infrastructural power (Mann 1986), there is bound to
be, in some cases, a degree of decoupling between the dominant national system of
economic organization and the particular functioning of any given region or industry. The
discussion that follows will tend to neglect decoupling and internal variation, remaining
for the sake of simplicity at the national aggregate or ideal type level. Our question can
thus be reformulated in the following way. How can we explain that quite distinct
national ideal types have persisted throughout the second part of the twentieth century in
spite of increasing similarities between national systems of economic organization?
Although exact definitions differ slightly, the concept of ‘national system of
economic organization’ proposed here is compatible with Chandler’s ‘forms of
capitalism’, Whitley’s ‘business systems’ and Piore and Sabel’s ‘industrial divides’
(Chandler 1990, Whitley 1999, Piore and Sabel 1984). We picture a national system of
economic organization as having six constitutive dimensions. As illustrated in figure 1,
the productive entity dimension represents the central one into which the other five feed.
- Figure 1 about here -
This paper focuses on the productive entity dimension, reducing in a somewhat schematic
but nevertheless expedient way, national systems of economic organization to their
centrally constitutive dimension.
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The productive entity dimension covers both the nature of firms and the nature of
their interactions. As shown in table 1, the nature of firms is operationalized through size,
ownership and internal (or organizational) structure. The dominant structure and logic of
markets is used as a proxy for firm interaction.
- Table 1 about here –
The productive entity dimension varies in some or all four elements from country to
country. Regular patterns can be identified throughout history, though, pointing to a
typology of systems of economic organization or forms of capitalism. In this typology,
presented in table 2, family and organized capitalisms are two variants of the same type,
dominant in Western Europe until the Second World War. Corporate capitalism, on the
other hand, is a radically different type, emerging in the United States at the turn of the
twentieth century.
- Table 2 about here –
In the post Second World War period, the transformation – when it took place –
of national systems of economic organization was generally towards the structural model
originally pioneered by the United States and labeled here corporate capitalism. This is
documented below for productive entities, by looking at evolution on all four elements –
size, ownership, organizational structure and logic of markets – in three Western
European countries, France, West Germany and Italy. The choice of countries was
oriented by methodological requirements. Considering the nature of the research
question, comparative historical analysis appeared to be the most appropriate
methodological framework (Skocpol 1979, Djelic 1998). Combining detailed case studies
with systematic comparison, it could handle at the same time both regularities across
cases and national specificities. The choice of cases, though, is key for this
methodological framework to work. Comparison becomes a real tool of analysis if
selected cases allow for both the ‘method of agreement’ – positive comparison – and the
‘method of difference’ – negative comparison (Mill 1843, Skocpol 1979, Djelic 1998).
France and Germany were selected here as positive cases, where outcomes proved
sufficiently similar and systems of economic organization have tended to evolve towards
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the American model, although in a somewhat different context. Italy was included as a
negative case, where the national system of industrial production appeared comparatively
much less affected by isomorphic trends.
Size
In a number of Western European countries, the number and role of large firms
increased quite significantly during the two decades that followed the end of the war
(Cassis 1997). As shown in figure 2, the twenty years following the end of the Second
World War have been characterized in West Germany or in France by rapid and radical
changes in the size structure of productive entities. Over those twenty years, West
German and French firms became increasingly similar to their American counterparts at
least as far as size and physical boundaries were concerned. The relative stability of
Italian productive entities with respect to their size, also documented in figure 2, appears
in contrast all the more striking. Small units retained in that country a predominant role
throughout the period.
- Figure 2 about here –
Ownership structures
Together with variation in the size of productive entities and in the physical
boundaries of firms came an evolution of their legal identities and of ownership
structures. From 1950 to 1970, ownership structures characterized by a dispersion of
ownership and limited liability – defining elements of the corporate structure – became
increasingly popular in France and in West Germany as figure 3 underscores. In both
countries, the widespread adoption of corporate ownership structures came with a sharp
decrease in the total number of sole proprietorships. In the meantime, in Italy, the number
of firms adopting corporate structures also increased but to a less significant extent while
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the overall number of sole proprietorships remained relatively stable.1 There were, on the
other hand, national specificities with respect to the types of corporate ownership
structures adopted in each country. In France and in Italy, the preference went to joint
stock companies. In West Germany, limited liability companies and limited partnerships
were clearly favored over the public joint stock corporation. 2
- figure 3 about here –
Organizational Structures
The postwar period also witnessed the adoption of new modes of internal
organization in Western European firms. The multidivisional firm, in particular,
pioneered in the 1920s by a couple of American corporations, spread at a quick pace
amongst large French and West German firms, starting in the 1950s. The multidivisional
structure, or M-form, was characterized by decentralization and a rational reorganization
of the firm’s activities along product lines. A general office was in charge of coordination
and long-range planning (Drucker 1946, Chandler 1962, Sloan 1963). Figure 4 below
shows that the multidivisional structure was unknown in Europe in 1950. Twenty years
later, around 40% of the largest French and German-owned manufacturing concerns had
adopted the M-form. Large Italian firms, on the other hand, were clearly more reluctant
and by 1970 a mere 25% of the largest Italian firms had settled for the M-form. Still, over
half of this same sample had already chosen diversification as a strategy by 1950. The
slow adoption of the M-form in Italy thus cannot be accounted for, as traditional
arguments would have it, only by a failure to diversify.3
- Figure 4 about here –
                                                
1 In fact, amongst Italian manufacturing firms employing over 50 people, 1,249 were sole proprietorships in 1951 and
1,781 in 1971. In France, this number had gone down from 1,408 in 1954 to 901 in 1966.
2 INSEE (1956,1974), Istituto Centrale di Statistica (1955, 1976), Statistisches Bundesamt (1953, 1973).
3 Chandler (1962). Neither could Italian reluctance to the M-form be explained by peculiarities of the environment.
Indeed, most foreign-owned subsidiaries in Italy (33 out of 39) had adopted the form by 1970.
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Logic of markets
While the nature of interfirm relations did also undergo changes in the postwar
period, particularly in France and in West Germany, measuring precisely such an
evolution is more difficult. The size of West German and French industrial legal entities
increased significantly over the period, which can be taken as a fairly good indication that
‘hierarchies’ were in the process of being created on a large scale in those two countries.
Those new large firms, or ‘hierarchies’, often the product of mergers and acquisitions,
internalized a number of formerly interunit relationships thus redefining in the process
the market logic in some sectors of the economy. This was not so much the case in Italy,
naturally, where small or medium-sized family-owned firms remained predominant.4
While industrial concentration was increasing both in France and in West
Germany, legislative bodies were in the meantime crafting and adopting acts outlawing
cartels and most forms of loose agreements. Organized markets thus became illegal in
most industrial sectors. Due in part to American pressure, the American antitrust tradition
was being transferred and ‘translated’ in France, West Germany and in the emerging
European economic space (Djelic 1998, Djelic and Bensedrine 2000). While exact
figures on cartels and loose agreements are not available for the period, the new
legislation undeniably deterred informal organization of markets. It also stimulated the
redefinition of many French and West German industrial sectors into competitive
oligopolies, following the model pioneered by American industry (Dyas and Thanheiser
1976, Berghahn 1986, Djelic 1998).
France, Germany and Italy – learning from history and comparison
Until the end of the Second World War, French, German and Italian capitalisms
all ranged somewhere between family and organized types (Chandler 1990, Cassis 1997,
Djelic 1998). Altogether, they were much more similar to each other than to the corporate
                                                
4 Both in France and in West Germany, the total number of industrial units was stable over the period at around
600,000. Some very small firms (less than 10 employees) disappeared but they were replaced, for the most part, by
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and managerial model that was then being institutionalized in the United States. On the
whole, structural features proved quite stable during that period in Europe and if there
was at all an evolution, it was undeniably towards increasingly organized markets and
structured forms of interfirm cooperation (Djelic, Koza and Lewin 2000). During those
years, Europeans tended to observe with disbelief and concern rather than enthusiasm the
corporate and managerial revolution that was transforming the economy and the society
in the United States (Duhamel 1930, Siegfried 1927, Djelic 1998).
The figures presented above show two things, however. First that this apparently
started to change after 1945. From that point on, the evidence is there of an evolution in
Western Europe of national systems of economic organization. And the common
direction of that evolution was clearly towards the corporate and managerial model
pioneered by the United States. Second, the figures also show that the extent of the
transformation and its impact were clearly not the same in all Western European
countries. The challenge is thus two-pronged. We need to understand what happened in
the post Second World War period to bring about the disruption of a long-standing
relative equilibrium. We also need to understand what explains national differences. We
rely for that on historical case studies, a summary of which is presented below. 5
France
Formally, France was one of the winners of the Second World War and as such
was granted a seat on the United Nations Security Council. In reality, France emerged
from the war a weak, divided and humiliated nation.
The men who came to power in 1945 had been the leaders, during the war, of the
French Resistance. This partly underground, partly exiled movement had fought not only
the Germans but also the official French regime, the Vichy government of Marshall
Petain. The sense of national crisis was particularly acute in this group. The dominant
                                                                                                                                                
small or medium-sized entities (between 10 and 500). Statistisches Bundesamt (1953, 1954, 1973, 1974), INSEE
(1956, 1974), Istituto Centrale di Statistica (1955, 1976).
5 For the full and detailed versions of these national case studies, see Djelic (1996) and Djelic (1998).
- 12 -
analysis was that both the military defeat and political shame of the war period could be
traced to prewar political, social but also economic arrangements (Michel and Mirkine-
Guetzevitch 1954). Members of the resistance coalition argued that the French economy
had not been equal, before the war, to the historical prestige of the nation and had not
served its ambitions. They claimed that it had been characterized by backwardness and
malthusianism – a systematic and organized policy of limiting productive capacities in
order to keep the balance in favor of producers. Both backwardness and malthusianism
were themselves seen as the consequences of rigid structures and of a conservative
attitude on the part of business communities. Despite ideological differences, members of
the resistance coalition agreed on one thing. There was a need for a radical break away
from this past (Michel and Mirkine-Guetzevitch 1954, de Gaulle 1964, Monnet 1976,
Bloch-Laine and Bouvier 1986).
A clean slate entailed a radical questioning of prewar economic structures and
their ‘modernization’ – if only as a means to regaining ‘Great Power’ status (de Gaulle
1964). There was disagreement, though, on what ‘economic modernization’ should mean.
In a world that emerged as bi-polar, there were two models of ‘Great Power’ – the Soviet
and the American. Since the French coalition brought together communists, socialists and
more conservative Gaullists, debates were heated. French hesitation only lasted, though,
until the geopolitical show-down of 1947. Truman’s Cold War speech in March and
General Marshall’s generous June plan both significantly contributed to bringing about a
watertight division of the world. In that context, France chose its side and communist
ministers were expelled from the government. By the end of 1947, France had been thrust
into and solidly anchored within the Western camp. Its economic and geopolitical
dependence on the USA had increased significantly and it had lost most of its bargaining
power. All these conditions combined, in the end, to make the American economy and
system of economic organization the only available and acceptable model for the
modernization of French structures.
It would take a small group of men to turn availability and likelihood into process.
In France, a ‘modernizing’ network took over or created in those early postwar years key
institutions at the border between state and economy and at the point of articulation of
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Franco-American relationships. For the most part those men originated from the public
sphere if they were not civil servants. Planning and preparing the large-scale
transformation of national economic, industrial and even social structures, French
modernizers looked towards the United States for models they could borrow. They
worked in close synergy with a small group of Americans, soon spinning a dense cross-
national web. The group of progressive American businessmen, civil servants and
economists with whom they collaborated had been closely involved in the American war
effort. Losing some leverage on the national scene after the end of the war, this group
turned to foreign affairs and took over in particular the Marshall plan machinery – the
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). Members of this cross-national network
had compatible objectives and they shared  a common ideology, a mixture of
Keynesianism, productivism and fordism. They also came to be institutionally
contiguous, in particular through the French planning council and the ECA Mission in
Paris, thus increasing the likelihood of collaboration. Jean Monnet was the cornerstone of
this Franco-American network.
While American support proved significant and instrumental, French initiative
was ultimately the main driver. The French modernizing group spontaneously took upon
itself the task of transfering the American structural model to the national economic
scene. Working from key positions of institutional power, this small group elaborated and
operated, on its own initiative, a set of mechanisms that were to bring about radical
transformations within the French economy. The infrastructural power of the French state
after World War II made it possible for this small group to have a significant impact over
the national economy (Cohen 1969, Kuisel 1981). French modernizers had the necessary
means and tools to implement their ambitious project – from nationalized industries, a
central but flexible planning system, a centralized system of credit and relays in all key
decision making centers. In the end, though, theirs was not an easy task and they
sometimes encountered significant resistance. In some cases, they had to turn to their
American friends, who helped them by playing ‘bad cop’. The French planning council
more than once pushed its own projects for France – generally highly compatible with
American objectives – by asking the ECA to threaten to block or delay the release of
Marshall funds (Djelic 1998).
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At the same time that the French modernizing network was a key transmission
belt for American models in that period, it was also an intervening variable. It played a
part as such in the reinterpretation and translation of the foreign model, while privileging
some dimensions over others. Thus, together with transfer came editing and diffraction.
French modernizers reinterpreted the American corporation as the state-owned ‘national
champion’. In the ‘American model’, they picked and chose mergers, large-size and
mass-production techniques. Highly distrusful of French business communities, they
rejected – for the time being – private or public ownership, favoring instead the control of
a new breed of civil servants (Kuisel 1981, Kesler 1985). Other elements of the original
model were also paid scant attention, at least in relative terms – smooth industrial
relations for example or strict antitrust legislation.
While involved in reshaping national structures, the French team also turned out
to be a driving force in the process of construction of a West European economic space.
Defining new rules of competition and market regulation at the European level, this
economic space was to have an impact ultimately, through trickle down types of
processes, on national systems of economic organization. Once again, the models were
American and the vision was that of a peaceful and united, mass-producing and mass-
consuming European continent – the ‘United States’ of Europe (Djelic 2000). In the
medium to long term, the European economic space was expected to work through an in-
depth redefinition of the rules of the economic game, bringing the latter much closer in
line with the rules dominant in the American economic space. Rather than constraining
economic actors into certain types of behaviors or hoping that they could be brought to
mimic them, the rationale was that to be long-lasting, changes should become deeply
embedded. This could take time, naturally, and the impact was not likely to be felt in the
short term. It would take new generations that would come to be socialized under those
new rules of the game. In the process, those generations would come to appropriate them
as their own rather than seeing them as foreign. This implied not only structural change
but also a radical shift in mentalities, values, economic and industrial ideologies, which
would only foster and ground further the structural changes already in progress. The logic
behind the European project was thus quite similar to that which led to the emergence
and development of management and business education in Europe and European
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countries (Engwall and Zamagni 1998) or to the spread to the region, in time, of
American antitrust principles (Djelic and Bensedrine 2000). Unsurprisingly, there was a
common base to the groups and individuals involved in those different projects and the
early group of American and French modernizers proved particularly crucial.
Conditions in France were thus quite favorable to a large-scale, cross-national
structural transfer. A deep sense of national crisis, the clear dependence in time on the
American super power and the existence of a small but institutionally powerful cross-
national network, the members of which worked in close synergy, all combined to make
such transfer a reality. This never was, though, a laboratory experiment. The challenger
set of structural features was being imported into a preexisting economic and institutional
landscape. It threatened in the process an incumbent system of economic organization
and run, unsurprisingly, into vested interests and a fair amount of resistance. As it turned
out, the main source of resistance lay within civil society and more particularly within
labor and business communities.
Business leaders, for one, had trouble accepting the radical questioning of their
traditional ways of organizing and doing business – radical questioning that was explicit
in the modernization project. They could not reconcile themselves with the transfer of a
foreign model they generally considered unfit for European conditions and disruptive of
their interests. In the period that immediately followed the end of the war, those business
communities were particularly weak in France, lacking in resources and for a while even
in the right to organize (Ehrmann 1957). This prevented reaction on their part at least for
a few years. By the early 1950s, though, they had regained the right to organize and were
rapidly reasserting their power and influence. The Conseil National du Patronat Francais
was getting ready to fight. Amongst the resources that played a role were naturally the
financial contributions of members. The control business groups exercized, directly or
indirectly, over a number of press outlets was also an important tool for them, allowing
them to orchestrate large-scale propaganda campaigns. The political route, finally, was
also important and business communities in France nurtured their relationships with
politicians and deputies, in particular through donations for campaign funds. Making use
of these various resources, the French business communities launched a war against the
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large-scale transfer of what they denounced as an ‘American model’. The issues of size
and ownership structure were at the heart of business resistance in France. In the end,
though, French business communities achieved little and they were not able to prevent
the structural transfer engineered by the cross-national network from taking place. A
weak point for them was that they were targeting in their lobbying efforts deputies and
politicians who, in the France of that time, had comparatively much less power and
leverage than technocrats and civil servants, at least when it came to economic affairs.
The pattern of resistance, though, turned out to have an impact on the transfer process
itself. It undeniably contributed to the deep distrust of private capitalism characteristic of
French technocrats in that period. In the end, it thus certainly had an impact on their
editing of the American corporation into the French state-owned national champion.
Business communities were another powerful source of resistance in France. The
communist CGT was by far the most powerful trade union (Dreyfus 1995). Its significant
reach at the grassroot level together with its rigid centralization explained that it could
rapidly mobilize a large share of the French working class. The strength of communist
influence over the French labor movement meant that resistance and opposition to the
modernizing project – generally symbolized by the close links between the French plan
and the Marshall plan – took, within the working class, a political and geopolitical
dimension. Starting in the summer of 1947, Soviet directives were calling for an all-out
war on the part of Western European labor against what Moscow denounced as an
American imperialist scheme and a declaration of war to the communist world. The
French communist trade union as a consequence launched violent social movements
bordering on insurrection and monitored, together with the French communist party,
fierce propaganda campaigns. The strategy of the modernizing network with respect to
such an obviously political opposition was to bypass communist groups and actors. Since
the cooperation of labor still appeared necessary to the modernization project, the
American element of the cross-national network worked together with the CIA and
American labor federations to identify, co-opt and sponsor interlocutors in the French
labor movement. The split of the CGT in April 1948 and the creation of the French CGT-




On May 8, 1945, Germany surrendered unconditionally. In a matter of days, the
end of the war brought along the collapse of the national order. The power vacuum that
followed was unparalleled in its extent but did not last. Soon after surrender, the four
victorious Allied powers, the USA, the UK, the USSR and France were exercising
complete political and military control, each in its own zone of occupation. An Allied
Control Council, made up of the four Allied Commanders-in-Chief acting jointly, was
created to allow for coordinated policy making. It rapidly became clear, though, that this
was a poor forum for collective decision making. Even before the Cold War split, the
Soviets were doing what they wanted while the Western zones of Germany increasingly
fell under American control. By the spring of 1948, Western powers had merged their
three zones, which were to become the Federal Republic of Germany. For some time
already, the USA had shouldered most of the financial burden for all three zones and their
power had increased to the point where they had ‘the right of final decision in financial
and economic matters’ (Clay 1950:178).
In an obvious way, West German territories were thus in a highly dependent
relationship to the United States. This would still be the case after the creation of the
Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. Although direct American presence and power
seemed to fade somewhat, West German dependence was perpetuated through the
launching of the Marshall Plan and following the onset of the Cold War. From occupying
power, the United States turned into a generous and regular provider of economic and
financial but also technical assistance. In a divided world, where the threat from the East
seemed real, the western superpower also appeared to be the only potential protector of a
weak and highly exposed West Germany.
In the early years that followed the end of the war, debates raged within the
American military government in Germany, within the Washington administration, and
between both, as to what the American policy in Germany should be (Clay 1950, Martin
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1950, Djelic 1998). Altogether, though, there was widespread agreement within
American ranks that prewar German political and economic institutions had in one way
or another been tainted by the Nazi era. When the dust had settled, the American
objective was to bring about a radical transformation of German economic and industrial
structures. This was only reinforced by the onset of the Cold War, which turned western
territories of Germany into a front bulwark against communism. The United States set
out, as a consequence, to transform the Federal Republic of Germany into a wealthy and
prosperous country. The West German economy was to become the engine of
reconstruction in Western Europe and an outpost of American type capitalism. For that, a
large-scale transfer of the American system of economic organization was in order.
Americans were convinced that a West German economy, revamped along the
lines of the ‘free competitive economy, which has been so successful in the US’ was a
prerequisite to political stability, peace and democracy in West Germany but also in
Europe. They were also convinced that the ‘German people could be taught to understand
and want such an economy’ (OMGUS, Bd18). By 1948, American officials in Germany
meant by ‘free competitive economy’ the American form of corporate capitalism rather
than the ‘free market’ of classical economists. The model they were intent on transferring
was an economy dominated by large-scale, mass-producing firms, competing on
oligopolistic markets and policed by antitrust legislation in the American tradition. From
the perspective of OMGUS members, it seemed that two features of this model of
reference were particularly important for the projected restructuring of the West German
economy and industry. They pointed, first of all, to the large size of American production
units and firms, allowing rationalization, economies of scale and scope, and mass
production. They also pointed out the regulation of anti-competitive behavior through
antitrust legislation, identifying such regulation as a necessary step towards a redefinition
of the West German economy and industry.
Key to the project of large-scale transfer was the decartelization and
deconcentration program. This program had initially been designed as a punitive one. Its
object was to ‘destroy Germany’s economic potential to wage war’ and to break up
German firms and cartels that had been the economic backbone of Nazi Germany. After
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much debate and internal in-fighting, this program was reinvented. By 1948, it had
become the basis of antitrust legislation in the American tradition – nothing more,
nothing less. The team in charge of the program was not striving for ‘the ideal of perfect
competition with hundred of firms competing in the production of each product’. Rather,
following the model set by American industry, it was advocating ‘an oligolistic structure
policed by the vigorous enforcement of antitrust or anticartel laws’. The claim was that
large corporations competing in oligopolistic markets were the surest way to combine, in
West Germany, ‘technical efficiency’ and ‘economies of scale’ with competition
(OMGUS, Bd18). Americans used the powers granted to them through the revamped
decartelization and deconcentration program to foster the structural redefinition, along
those lines, of firms and interfirm relations in many industries (Berghahn 1986, Djelic
1998). As OMGUS members acknowledged, they could do at the time ‘anything they
wanted, within some limits, to the German economy’ (OMGUS Bd42).
While aware of their power and using it to further their project for Germany,
Americans also understood that reforms would not last if they were merely being
imposed on the Germans. After all, the period of acute German geopolitical dependence
was bound to end at some point. What would be left then of the radical American
project? The solution to that problem, OMGUS soon realized was to co-opt as early as
possible a group of German decision makers that were sympathetic enough to the
American project. As it turned out, they managed to identify such a group, around the
then marginal German economist, Ludwig Erhard. The Freiburg school, as this group was
known, had been before the war and still was small, powerless and a clear outsider in the
German landscape. The ‘social market economy’ they envisioned had been defined in
radical opposition to the tightly cartelized prewar and Nazi German economy. It centered
around the ‘principle of freedom and liberalism’ (Peacock and Wilgerodt 1989). While
Erhard’s colleagues meant by that the ‘free market’ of classical economists, Erhard
himself pleaded for a reconciliation of competition with efficiency and productivity. He
thus advocated large-scale productive entities competing freely in oligopolistic markets
as the most direct route to a mass-producing and mass-consuming society which he
clearly championed (Erhard 1958). This program was music to American ears and the
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close fit between this program and the American project for West Germany explains that
OMGUS did a lot to bring this group in the center of German political life.
Ludwig Erhard once called himself an ‘American invention’ (Berghahn 1984,
Nicholls 1984). In political terms, this is indeed true. From virtual outcasts, intellectually
and institutionally, in their own country, Ludwig Erhard and members of the Freiburg
school were thrust in positions of power by American authorities (Wallich 1955, Nicholls
1984, Peacock and Willgerodt 1989). In 1946, the American military government
appointed Ludwig Erhard Minister of Economic Affairs in his home state of Bavaria.
After the merging of the British and American zones of occupation in 1947, a number of
new German institutions were created. In particular a German economic council was
granted some responsibility over Bizonal economic issues. The chairman, who was to act
as a Minister of Economic Affairs with limited powers, was to be elected by his peers.
This election had been planned by the occupying powers as a political process, a first step
towards democracy and it was to reflect the balance of power between German parties.
Johannes Semler, a member of the Bavarian christian democratic party (CSU) was
elected in July 1947 and became the first chairman of the German economic council. His
public speeches, highly critical of American military government, and some of his actions
as chairman soon attracted a lot of attention. In January 1948, members of the American
military government decided unilaterally to dismiss him. In a move that was not quite
democratic this time, they imposed Ludwig Erhard in his place (Peterson 1977). This was
the beginning, for Ludwig Erhard, of a long career, first as Minister of Economic Affairs
until 1963 and, from 1963 to 1966, as Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.
In the process, this meant the institutionalization of a cross-national network.
Both the German and American elements of this network were to work, throughout the
years, in close synergy and in the same direction. The Ministry of Economic Affairs
around Ludwig Erhrard – and later on the West German government – appropriated most
of the structural reforms that had initially been launched by American occupation
authorities. Those reforms were thus lastingly embedded in the West German context,
gaining legitimacy in time albeit painfully, together with their German proponents.
Throughout his career, Ludwig Erhard consistently received the full support of the
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American administration – the American Military Government in Germany or OMGUS
and later the American High Commission / ECA Mission in Germany, but also the
Washington administration.
With hindsight, it seems unlikely in fact that Ludwig Erhard and his team could
have done without such support. Their program and the American project for West
Germany were radical and the system of economic organization both were advocating
was a clear challenge to German structural and ideological traditions. Civil society once
again reacted to what was then perceived as large-scale attempt at grafting on the national
soil a foreign economic logic. And reactions proved sometimes in the German case to be
of an extreme violence, particularly within the national business community.
German business leaders fought fiercely on the issue of cartels and competition.
Both the German and American elements in the cross-national network had declared a
war on cartels, which they saw as essentially collusion schemes set up to control
competition, preserve stability, and ensure high profits. Those systematic attacks against
cartels and organized capitalism infuriated most German business leaders from the very
beginning. In the early postwar period, though, reactions could at best be muted. In those
times of ‘denazification’ when all form of official representation was prohibited,
resistance was by necessity limited and unorganized. By the early months of 1950, when
the Allied prohibition on the formation of trade associations was finally allowed to lapse,
a federation of business associations – the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI)
– was created in West Germany. Most members of the BDI had belonged, before and
during the war, to the former German federation, the Reichsverband der Deutschen
Industrie (RDI). A number had been involved in the corporatist institutions of Nazi
Germany. Altogether, the BDI was therefore quite conservative and attached to prewar
patterns of economic organization. In defense of cartels and collective agreements, West
German business leaders initially used fairly traditional arguments, carried through from
the prewar period. Free competition, they claimed, led to dangerous price wars, the
consequence of which in turn was generally a series of failures, particularly amongst
smaller and medium-sized concerns. They presented, on the other hand, cartels and
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collective agreements as essentially sound mechanisms to ‘avoid ruinous competition and
to prevent the waste of material and labor capacities’ (OMGUS Bd42).
When they realized that such arguments did not carry, West German business
leaders turned to much more aggressive and violent strategies and rhetorics. Feeling
increasingly secure and powerful after the creation of the BDI, they launched a
systematic and violent propaganda campaign against competition and its champions in
the West German political and administrative elite. Ludwig Erhard and the West German
Ministry of Economic Affairs were clearly the main targets of these attacks. Throughout
the 1950s, the West German business community repeatedly accused the Ministry of
Economic Affairs of being the instrument of American occupation authorities and of
implementing an American policy that had originally been designed to weaken the
German economy. Members of the BDI found it ‘hard to understand why the Federal
Minister of Economic Affairs wished to lead and force industry into economic freedom
against its own will’ (Erhard 1963: cha.16). There were two main fronts to the war of the
BDI – nationally, the passing of a German anticartel act and in Europe, negotiations
around the Schuman plan.
One of the first commitments of Erhard upon his nomination as chairman of the
German Economic Council was to sponsor a German anticartel law that was to replace
the Allied act of 1947. The confrontation with the German business community lasted for
close to 10 years and the German parliament only voted such a law in July 1957.
Throughout those years the fight was violent. The BDI used the media it controlled, such
as the economic weekly Der Volkswirt, to orchestrate harsh attacks. It also turned to more
direct means of pressure, through its political contacts within the Christian Democratic
Party. Members of the BDI threatened to reduce their campaign contributions to the CDU
for the 1953 elections if the bill was not modified (Braunthal 1965). Bypassing Ludwig
Erhard, they also tried to appeal directly to Konrad Adenauer, German Chancellor and
leader of the CDU. In the end, Ludwig Erhard and his collaborators held fast mostly
thanks to American support and to the scarecrow of a tougher US-imposed legislation.
The West German act prohibited cartels in principle, following in that the American
Sherman Act (Djelic and Bensedrine 2000). The violent resistance of the German
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business communities had left its marks, though, and the exceptions that were included in
the act were the result of compromise.
While confrontation was still in full swing on the national scene, the West
German business community became involved in a parallel fight on the European level.
The emerging coal and steel community (ECSC) was a source of significant concern for
West German industries particularly with respect to the cartel issue. Although the
confrontation was taking place in a different context, the pattern was fairly similar. On
one side, a few European – and even more precisely French – technocrats and civil
servants were working with members of the American administration to institutionalize a
competitive logic in the emerging European market for coal and steel. On the other side,
national representatives of heavy industries were apparently intent on fighting this
project. There was no institutional framework, however, that could formally bring
together all Western European coal and steel industries. Common objectives and
interests, furthermore, were often offset by national rivalries. As a consequence,
opposition to the coal and steel community remained structured nationally. The strategy
of Jean Monnet and his team had been to exclude entirely from ECSC negotiations all
national representatives of European heavy industries. However, they could not prevent –
except in the French case – the weaving of informal links between industry members and
members of national delegations. Private interests and corporatist claims were thus bound
to influence, even if only partially and indirectly negotiation proceedings. This was
illustrated when, under strong pressure from heavy industries’ representatives, the West
German delegation denounced the anticartel provisions of the ECSC treaty. Negotiations
were consequently stalled for several months and if it had not been, once again, for
American intervention, they may never have started again. Indeed the American
administration and John McCloy in particular, then American High Commissioner in
Germany, were instrumental in dragging the German delegation back to the negotiation
table and in bringing Germans finally to accept and ratify the anticartel provisions of the
ECSC treaty.
Those provisions are much more than they seem. Articles 60 and 61 in the ECSC
treaty, they were directly transferred in 1957 to the Treaty of Rome – that founded the
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European Economic Community – where they became articles 85 and 86. In the words of
Jean Monnet, those articles ‘represented a fundamental innovation in Europe’. Robert
Bowie had drafted those two articles, building unmistakably on American antitrust
tradition. A Harvard Law School antitrust specialist, Bowie was also General Counsel to
the American High Commissioner in Germany and as such closely involved in the
drafting of the national German legislation. For Jean Monnet, the ‘esssential antitrust
(sic) legislation reigning over the common market today ha(d) its origins in those few
sentences for which (he did) not regret to have fought during four months’ (Monnet 1976:
413). And indeed, articles 60 and 61 of the ECSC treaty laid the foundations of antitrust
legislation for the common European market with a significant impact, over time, on
national systems of economic organization as well as on transnational patterns of
collaboration and competition.
Italy
Like many other countries in Europe at the time, Italy was after the Second World
War in a state of utter destitution. The country had been highly dependent on the USA for
emergency relief and other resources ever since September 1943 when the fascist
government had surrendered. At the same time, though, that the USA were playing such a
key role on the Italian scene, the strength of the communist party was the source of
bargaining power for that country at least between 1945 and 1947 (Hughes 1965,
Romano 1977, Miller 1986). The year of 1947 marked a turning point, though, as it did in
France. Italians could not postpone taking sides in the Cold War anymore. During a trip
to the USA, early in 1947, the Italian Premier Alcide de Gasperi tried to secure renewed
American economic assistance. He was told in no uncertain terms that financial and
economic aid would be much more forthcoming of communist ministers left the Italian
government.
Clear advice of that sort combined with rumors that Washington was preparing a
large-scale aid package for Europe to speed up action on the Italian national scene. In
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May 1947, Alcide de Gasperi set up a new government without communist or left-wing
socialist ministers. When Marshall dollars started to flow in, by 1948, Italy was well and
truly anchored to the West and most of its bargaining power in the relationship with the
USA had been lost. The American system of economic organization was therefore, and
from that point on, available as a model for Italy as much as it was for France. Contacts
between Italy and the USA became increasingly numerous throughout the Marshall Plan
period, multiplying the opportunities for the Italian population to become familiar with
American economic structures. Those structural arrangements characterized a Great
Power that also happened to be, for Italy, the main provider and the sole protector.
Conditions thus seemed to have been fulfilled for the American system of economic
organization to become a model, both familiar and superior, for Italian reconstruction.
It was soon obvious, however, that the American model was much less likely to
be considered in Italy than it was in France. The first reason for that was that the Italian
power elite lacked, after the war, the sense of crisis and urgency that defined its French
counterpart. The group controlling political and institutional positions of power in Italy
did not define itself in radical opposition to the former regime and system, nor did it
declare a state of national emergency and crisis that would call for radical structural
transformations. In Italy, the rejection of fascism had taken place during the war and had
been, as a consequence, relatively short-lived. After the surrender of the fascist
government in 1943, a number of Italians had shared in the Allied war effort. When the
war came to an end in 1945, Italy was in a relatively ambiguous situation. That special
status, neither winner nor loser, clearly had to be preserved in order to prevent issues
such as military occupation or reparations to surface. Italians were better off forgetting
their fascist past than loudly rejecting it (Miller 1986).
A second reason explains that the American model never became in Italy the type
of reference that it was in France or West Germany. In Italy, the cross-national network
broke down. Members of the ECA failed to identify and co-opt on the Italian national
scene, actors with whom they could collaborate to bring about a radical transformation of
economic and industrial structures. After March 1947, the main objective of the USA in
Italy was to weaken the communist movement (Hughes 1965, De Cecco 1972, Miller
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1986). In that context, the American administration came to support the Christian
Democratic Party as the only alternative it could identify in Italy to communism or
fascism. This party was heir to the prewar Popolari, the people’s party. By the end of the
war, the people’s party brought together all those Italians wary of extremism and fearful,
in particular, of communism. It thus emerged as a patchwork of many different political
trends, united essentially around a preference for the West in the geopolitical
confrontation that was dividing the world. Middle classes were dominant in the electorate
of the Christian Democratic Party, with a prominent group of craftsmen, shopkeepers,
and small business entrepreneurs.
In the end, the Christian Democratic Party and the governments it sponsored in
Italy proved somewhat disappointing to the American administration and in particular to
the sponsors in that administration of a ‘European neo-capitalism’ (Hogan 1985). The
christian democratic elite and the American group involved in Italian affairs turned out to
have little in common, both with regard to ideology and objectives. There was clearly no
equivalent, within the Italian public sphere, to the generation of French modernizing
technocrats or to the group in Germany around Ludwig Erhard. This left Americans from
the ECA with no valid interlocutor within the Italian government – nobody that talked the
same language, nobody to rely on.
From 1948, the ECA country Mission in Italy was headed by James Zellerbach,
former chairman of the board of the Crown Zellerbach Corporation. He had a project for
Italy that was similar to ECA projects for the rest of Western Europe. The transformation
of Italy towards a mass-producing, mass-consuming society would, according to him,
quell political conflicts and rule out the possibility of communist takeover. This
transformation, however, would require the creation of large firms in most industrial
sectors and necessitate a significant increase in productivity levels (Miller 1986, Harper
1986). The ECA Mission in Italy was ready to elaborate and to help implement programs
that would increase production capacities and bring about the modernization and
restructuring of Italian industry. Members of the ECA Mission in Italy, in fact, pointed to
what was being done in France. Marshall aid should be used to invest in a few key
industries that would have, in turn, a multiplier effect on the rest of the economy. But
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Keynesian productivists in the ECA did not find any collaborators sympathetic to their
project on the Italian political and technocratic scene. Members of the ECA Mission in
Rome and those men in positions of institutional power in Italy seemed separated by an
abyss. Communication, most of the time, was impossible and both groups worked at
counter purposes.
Retrospectively, things could have turned differently. There was, after all, a
tradition of modernizing technocrats in Italy dating back to the period of national
unification. Even after 1945, the tradition was perpetuated but Italian modernizers were
to be found mostly amongst those businessmen and managers running the few large
Italian firms, not in the public, technocratic or political sphere. Amongst those few large
Italian firms, the state holdings inherited from the fascist years – the ENI or IRI – could
have been used as powerful tools in a state-led strategy of economic and industrial
modernization. Enrico Mattei at the head of ENI (the energy holding) or Oscar
Sinigaglia, who was leading IRI’s Finsider (steel arm of IRI) were sympathetic to
Keynesian and productivist values. As a matter of fact, they often developed and nurtured
direct contacts with the ECA Mission in Rome and with American business leaders.
Although they were quite powerful, their impact on the Italian economy as a whole was
altogether quite limited. The gap was quite significant between them and the mass of
Italian business owners, running small and medium-sized family firms tied together
through dense, often local, networks mixing collaboration and competition.
In the Italian case, Americans had thus failed in their strategy of co-optation. The
lack of a national sense of crisis combined with the breakdown of the cross-national
network to make it highly unlikely that a large-scale, cross-national transfer of structural
arrangements would be considered let alone undertaken. Postwar Italian power holders
did not engage in a radical and systematic questioning of prewar economic and social
arrangements. Nor did they advocate a radical transformation of industry structure and
the transfer, to their country, of the American system of economic organization.
American modernizers, present in Italy through the Marshall Plan administration,
nevertheless attempted to institutionalize in that country the same types of transfer
mechanisms that were proving quite effective in France and in West Germany. For the
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most part, those attempts failed. The absence of sympathetic Italian interlocutors and
institutional relays frustrated and curtailed the efforts of American modernizers in that
country. In the longer term, the creation of a Western European economic community, of
which Italy was an early member, would end up having an impact on the Italian
economy. As documented earlier, though, the scale and scope of transformations that
were to affect the Italian system of economic organization in the twenty years after the
end of the war could clearly not compare with what was taking place at the same time in
France or in West Germany.
Towards a deconstruction of globalization
Building on the historical case studies briefly summarized above and on their
systematic comparison, we propose a new perspective on the contemporary episode of
globalization. In contrast to the literature on national variants of capitalism, we believe
that there are indeed pressures pushing for structural isomorphism and the
homogenization of national systems of economic organization. But those pressures, we
argue, are far from being neutral and a-historical. While the literature on globalization
tends to emphasize economic and technological determinism or even a neutral but
inescapable rationalization of the world, we have asked here about origins, defining
moments and enabling contexts. We argue that the transformation of economic
institutions over the second half of the twentieth century, in Western Europe but also in
the rest of the world, cannot be understood without taking into account the peculiar
nature of geopolitical relationships in the early postwar years. At that point, pressures for
change had a lot to do with the clear imbalance of power between the United States as a
dominant superpower and a more or less dependent set of countries. Unmistakably, the
historical roots of our contemporary episode of globalization lay in the early attempt,
following World War II, at large-scale ‘Americanization’ of economic institutions. In the
end, however, convergence following the ‘American model’ was partial at best. The
transfer of that model came together with its local reinterpretation, editing and thus with
hybridization. This filtering process and the enduring nature of preexisting national
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legacies explain that local peculiarities persist to this day, allowing us to set apart
national variants of capitalism.
The attempt at large-scale ‘Americanization’ of the post Second World War
period took place, we have shown, in the context of a significant redefinition of the
geopolitical environment. When the United States took on the leadership of the Western
world, parallels were quickly drawn between, on the one hand, American geopolitical and
economic power and, on the other, the peculiar and unique system of industrial
production then dominant in that country. In the context of national crisis and radical
questioning that characterized a number of Western European countries, the American
system of industrial production unsurprisingly became a model to be transferred and
adopted.
At the same time, the large-scale structural transfer was made possible and
fostered by the emergence of a small cross-national network controlling key resources
and positions of power. The transfer process was institutionalized through the systematic
setting-up and operation of various cross-national transfer mechanisms, whether of
mimetic, coercive or normative types. Such a transfer was naturally bound to disrupt
preexisting economic and social arrangements. It did encounter obstacles and sometimes
even triggered organized resistance and opposition within national units. As a direct
consequence, the transfer was not equally successful in all Western European countries.
The original model was adapted, 'translated', edited, leading quite often to hybrid forms
of structural arrangements. This largely accounts for the persistence, in the long term, of
significant differences not only across Western European national industries but also
between European and American industries.
History tells us, therefore, that globalization is a process – not a state of things. It
is historical and political – and not universal and neutral. It is about the cross-national
transfer of dominant models rather than about the spontaneous and parallel emergence in
many different countries of similar solutions. This historic and political cross-national
transfer process we see as having three main moments. As underscored in figure 5, cross-
national transfer will not take place in the absence of enabling conditions. It can be
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characterized by multiple combinations of mechanisms and it is bound to run into
obstacles, although the nature and strength of these obstacles will vary.
- figure 5 about here –
Conditions
In order for a large-scale, cross-national transfer process to be possible, to be
contemplated and eventually to be launched, it appears that a number of conditions
should be met simultaneously. First of all, a traumatic disruption should bring, at the
national level, an acute sense of crisis and a questioning of the legitimacy of preexisting
institutional and structural arrangements. Then, a redefinition of the geopolitical
environment and, in particular, the emergence of relationships of asymmetrical
dependence should turn a foreign system of economic organization into an available
model, in other words both familiar and perceived to be superior. Finally, a cross-national
network of actors, sharing similar and compatible if not common objectives should
bridge the gap between both countries. These 'modernizing' individuals may be only a
small minority within their respective national environments. They should nevertheless
hold and control key positions of power both within cross-national institutional channels
and in those national institutions located at the articulation of state and economy in the
receiving country, which are bound to play an essential role in the transfer process. This
set of three conditions, it is proposed here, will significantly increase the likelihood that a




The concrete implementation, however, of such a large-scale, cross-national
transfer process will also require that a number of transfer mechanisms be not only
elaborated but also operated. The comparative and historical study has made it possible to
identify three main types of transfer mechanisms. Using DiMaggio and Powell's (1983)
terminology, these mechanisms are labeled respectively 'mimetic', 'coercive' and
'normative'. Varying degrees of geopolitical dependence account for differences in the
mix of transfer mechanisms. The nature of this mix, on the other hand, is bound to have
an impact on the transfer process, for example on its speed and on the extent of the
'translation' or adaptation of the original model. It may also to some extent determine
national reactions, and in particular the degree of local resistance and the violence of
opposition movements. Table 3 proposes a summary description of the different paths a
cross-national transfer process could take depending on the type of transfer mechanism
predominant in each case.
- table 3 about here –
Obstacles
The concrete operating of those various transfer mechanisms is naturally not
likely to run smoothly. Obstacles could emerge from the existence of powerful and
organized groups with a significant capacity to mobilize and intent on resisting the
transfer process. The porosity of state institutions could apparently increase further the
ability of those groups to impose their own views and thus to successfully resist the
transfer process, while limiting at the same time the autonomy of political or
administrative actors. Furthermore, notwithstanding the degree of resistance and the
impact of opposition groups, a large-scale cross-national transfer process may be
considerably slowed down, if not brought to a halt, because of the limited infrastructural
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power (Mann 1986) of political institutions and state actors, and in particular because of
their limited leverage over the national economy and industry.
Cross-national processes of transfer or diffusion thus cannot be uncoupled from a
concomitant process of diffraction, partial reinterpretation, 'translation', editing or
hybridization of the original model to be transferred. The combination of those two
indissociable processes seems to require the theoretical cross-breeding of two variants of
neo-institutionalism. On the one hand, the tradition of ‘phenomenological’ neo-
institutionalism (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Scott and Meyer 1994) can be used to account
for diffusion. On the other hand, the associated processes of reinterpretation or editing
will be better explained using the variant of neo-institutionalism that was labeled earlier
‘historical’ (Fligstein 1990, Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997, Whitley 1999). The cross-
fertilization between those two traditions has undeniable implications for the thriving but
multi-faceted ‘neo-institutional’ school in economic sociology and point to potentially
quite fruitful research directions.
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Table 1: Productive Entity – Operationalization
Nature of Firm Firm Interaction
Size Ownership structure Organizational structure Logic of markets








































* By 'mixed forms', we understand here those legal structures which are essentially crossbreeds of 'partnerships' and
'joint stock companies', such as for example the German GmbH, the French SARL or 'Société en commandite'. Those
forms are located somewhere in between personal and public ownership.









AGENTS Model country Local Foreign or local
PROCESS Imposing Imitating Embedding
SPEED Rapid Medium Slow
IMPACT Short-lived and fragile Stable and long lasting Fairly permanent
RESULT Similar to model Partial adaptation Partial adaptation
REACTIONS Rejection, opposition Resistance or support Indifference to support
Figure 1: national systems of economic organization – six constitutive dimensions
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1 to 49 employees 50 to 499 500 and more
Note : Those figures are for manufacturing industry only. Utilities, energy and construction are not included.
Sources: Bureau of the Census (1951,1971), Statistisches Bundesamt (1954,1974), INSEE (1956,1974), Istituto
Centrale di Statistica (1955,1976).
Figure 3: Joint-stock companies, limited liability companies and limited
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Note : Those figures are for manufacturing industries only. Utilities, energy and construction are not included.
Sources: INSEE (1956,1974), Statistisches Bundesamt (1953,1973), Istituto Centrale di Statistica (1955,1976)














FRG, France, Italy      
Sources: Fligstein (1990), p.336, USA = 100 largest companies. Dyas and Thanheiser (1976), p.29, FRG = 78 largest
German-owned companies; France = 79 French-owned companies; Italy = 61 Italian-owned companies.
Figure 5. Three moments in the cross-national transfer process
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